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Abstract. We study the market for new (movie) DVDs in the United States. Our demand
model captures seasonality, freshness (i.e., time between theatrical and DVD release), and
state dependence. We also develop a structural model of dynamic competition in which
studios balance waiting for high-demand weeks, against reduced freshness, and against
competitive crowding. We find that studios emphasize DVD revenues from larger movies
(by theatrical revenue) over DVD revenues from smaller movies. Studios also emphasize
revenue from consumers who prefer larger and fresher movies. These behaviors are con-
sistent with managerial conservatism: studio executives forgo DVD revenues from smaller
movies to ensure the DVD success of larger movies.
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1. Introduction
For movie studios, choosing the release date of a
new DVD is a crucial, yet complex, decision. Con-
sumers have seasonally varying demand for newDVDs
(Chiou 2008). Therefore, studios have an incentive to
wait to release a movie in a seasonal peak demand
week. However, consumers also value freshness of new
DVDs—i.e., DVDs released soon after theatrical release
(Hennig-Thurau et al. 2007, Mukherjee and Kadiyali
2011). Thus, studios face a tradeoff between waiting for
higher-demand weeks and capitalizing on a movie’s
freshness. Further, competitive considerations compli-
cate studios’ decision. In response to seasonal consumer
preferences, studios release more DVDs close to sea-
sonal peak-demandweeks, leading to crowding (Chiou
2008, Einav 2010). Thus, in addition to the demand sea-
sonality (and freshness sensitivity), studios also must
consider their rivals’ DVD release dates.
Moreover, studio executives may exhibit managerial
conservatism in their DVD release date choices. Con-
servatism is when managers choose a traditional form
of behavior or industry practice rather than being out-
liers from the herdwith a nontraditional/experimental
behavior or strategy. For example, Zwiebel (1995) mod-
els a competitive equilibrium where each manager
chooses an action taking into account other managers’
choice. Managers know their own ability, but princi-
pals (owners or investors) do not. Zwiebel shows that
incomplete information about manager and project
outcomes may lead to principals evaluating manage-
rial ability by relative performance. Managers who
choose the “standard action” are evaluatedwith amore
accurate benchmark than managers with nonstandard
choices. Therefore, choosing an outlier strategy carries
the risk of not having a well-established benchmark
for evaluation; the established benchmark is based on
traditional strategies. For example, an outlier strategy
might generate profits later or with greater uncer-
tainty compared to the industry’s traditional strategy
that is profitable sooner or more certain. This leads
to herd behavior, with most managers targeting well-
established benchmarks. There are other agency mod-
els that generate similar herding behavior; see Section 2
for more details.
Prior studies of the movie industry have found evi-
dence consistent with conservatism in pretheatrical
decision making, including choices in casting (Ravid
1999, Basuroy et al. 2003), pricing in theatrical distri-
bution (Orbach and Einav 2007), and release timing
for theatrical distribution (Einav 2010). While these
studies investigate pretheatrical decisions, our paper
examines posttheatrical decisions. In these posttheatri-
cal decisions, on the one hand, theatrical revenues are
known, and hence movie quality is more visible. This
might mitigate revenue uncertainty for managers, free-
ing them from conservative to nontraditional choices.
On the other hand, the revelation of information in the
theatrical channel might reinforce theatrical channel
conservatism. For example, given the historical central-
ity of blockbusters in Hollywood, studios likely do not
want to see theatrical successes failing in DVD release
because of poor release decisions. Therefore, studio
3536
Published in Management Science, 2018 Aug, 64 (8) 3469-3970.
htt s://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2795
Mukherjee and Kadiyali: The Competitive Dynamics of New DVD Releases
Management Science, 2018, vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 3536–3553, ©2017 INFORMS 3537
executives might be conservative and pay more atten-
tion to the DVD revenues of larger (by theatrical rev-
enue) movies, especially if they think their rivals will
also do the same.
Our paper develops novel structural econometric
models of demand and competition for the new
(movie) DVD market. To manage computational and
data demands, we draw on the literature in aggrega-
tive games. A game is aggregative if a player’s payoff
is a function of her own actions and an aggregator
function of the actions of all players.1 By extension,
demand is aggregative if the demand for the products
or services offered by a player is a function of her own
actions and an aggregator function of the actions of
all players. Therefore, to model demand, we employ
the aggregate latent classmultinomial logit (MNL) ran-
dom utility model (RUM). We extend this aggregative
demandmodel to account for state dependence (where
past purchases may affect utility in the current period)
and seasonality.
On the supply side, the empirical model is based
on a game of incomplete information. We define the
set of consumer-segment–specific aggregative statistics
from our demand model to be the state vector in the
game. In our context, the state vector summarizes the
impact of the incumbents and potential entrants on
the expected demand from releasing a movie on DVD
on any release date. A time-nonhomogeneous Markov
transition kernel describes the (seasonal, time-varying)
evolution of the state vector. We solve for the ratio-
nal (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium, which is the time
nonhomogeneous Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE)
in release-date choices. We develop a novel conditional
choice probability estimator: first, we estimate the tran-
sition kernel and the policy functions from the data
and then maximize the conditional likelihood (condi-
tional choice probability, given studio beliefs) of the
observed release dates.
We apply these econometric models to study new
(movie) DVD sales in the United States between 2000
and 2005. We find two distinct consumer segments
that vary both in the seasonality of their preferences
and their responsiveness to DVD attributes includ-
ing prior theatrical success and freshness. To uncover
possible conservatism, we estimate a series of com-
petition models with nested flexible maximands that
sequentially consider segment, studio, time, andmovie
asymmetries in studios’ objective functions. The data
suggest that managers pay more attention to maxi-
mizing the DVD revenues of larger (by prior theatri-
cal success) movies and emphasize DVD demand from
consumers who prefer larger movies. Therefore, the
evidence is consistent with conservatism: studio exec-
utives forgo revenues from movies that were less suc-
cessful inmovie theaters, to safeguard the DVD success
of movies proven theatrical successes.
Our paper makes the following contributions.
Methodologically, the model structure can have sev-
eral applications. Particularly, most prior studies of
seasonality have abstracted from seasonality in com-
petition and only focused on demand seasonality.
Further, extant game-theoretic frameworks of compe-
tition require restrictive symmetry assumptions (e.g.,
symmetric payoffs, symmetric rivals, time-symmetric
decision rules) that preclude seasonal competition.
A strength of our modeling approach is its ability
to accommodate flexible (asymmetric) payoff struc-
tures, asymmetric rivals, and time-varying (seasonal)
marketing mixes, as is common in many seasonality-
relatedapplications. Substantively,weadd to theempir-
ical knowledge base on an important phenomenon—
managerial conservatism—thathas received theoretical
attention but relatively limited empirical attention. Par-
ticularly, empirical studies have found evidence of con-
servatism based on reduced-form models or based on
postestimation patterns of structural estimates. In con-
trast, by embedding conservatism-consistent payoffs in
a structural model, we can obtain drivers of conser-
vatism. Simulations based on structural estimates allow
us to examine the effects of conservatism on both mar-
ket outcomes (release dates) and expected revenues.
2. Literature Review
Our paper relates to the following five broad streams
of the literature.
First, our paper relates to models of the revenue of
a movie, given movie attributes (such as the genre of
the movie) and the revenues of the movie in prior
markets or periods. For example, Neelamegham and
Chintagunta (1999) and Elberse and Eliashberg (2003)
study the diffusion of international box office receipts
after domestic release. Luan and Sudhir (2007) study
the impact of sequential release strategies on forward-
looking consumers in the primary (theatrical) chan-
nel. In building our demand model, we use several
explanatory variables validated in this literature.
Second, our paper relates to papers that study sea-
sonality in movie demand. For example, Radas and
Shugan (1998) use an innovative transformation of time
to build a model of seasonal demand. Einav (2007)
introduces the idea of capturing seasonal changes in
preferences by adding a time-varying fixed effect to the
utility of a representative consumer. Chiou (2008) and
Mukherjee and Kadiyali (2011) measure whether sea-
sonal market expansions and contractions occur due
to intertemporal changes in preferences for movies, or
due to concurrent movie releases. Unlike these papers,
our demand allows for heterogeneity in seasonal (and
other) preferences. Specifically, we embed a Fourier
basis in the consumer utility function, which enables a
flexible and yet parsimonious capture of seasonality.
Third, our paper relates to a stream of the literature
that has studied the optimal release timing of movies
Mukherjee and Kadiyali: The Competitive Dynamics of New DVD Releases
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(e.g., Krider and Weinberg 1998, Lehmann and Wein-
berg 2000, Prasad et al. 2004, Ma et al. 2013). The paper
most similar in structure and intent to ours is Einav
(2010), who studies theatrical release competition. Sim-
ilar to Einav (2010), we use the solution concept of a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a game of incomplete
information to model release decisions. We extend the
demand model in Einav (2007) to account for hetero-
geneity.We also extend the competitionmodel of Einav
(2010) to allow for time-varying strategies and asym-
metric firm payoffs. He examines four major holiday
weeks and the adjacent weeks. The release-time com-
petition is among the set of movies already present in
these weeks competing for release in the peak week
rather than adjacent weeks. Our competition model
is for all movies that are unreleased in DVD and for
all future weeks. Therefore, our model is significantly
more general (and complex) and allows for richer and
more realistic forms of competition.
Fourth, our study relates to the literature on models
of the strategic choices of competing forward-looking
firms. Dorazelski and Pakes (2007) provide an excellent
descriptionof theMPE framework that is theworkhorse
for analyses of the strategic decisions of compet-
ing forward-looking firms. Recent applications of the
framework include Gardete (2016), Hollenbeck (2017),
and Shen (2014). Our model of competition method-
ologically extends these models as follows. First, we
modify the baseline model to capture the time non-
homogeneity of the decision environment. Second, by
using aggregative statistics derived from the demand
model,we can capture the complex competitivedynam-
ics of the release timinggame. Third, tractability is a key
concern in the dynamic games literature. We develop
an estimation strategy that allows formore-flexible firm
objective functions, including specifications that vary
by both firm and product attribute.
Last, our study is related to the literature on man-
agerial conservatism. As discussed in the introduc-
tion, Zwiebel (1995) proposes a principal–agent model
where owners do not observe managerial ability. In
his model, it is optimal for principals to judge perfor-
mance by relative ability. Facedwith this compensation
scheme, managers choose traditional actions rather
than nontraditional actions. This is done to ensure
that the relative performance is measurable because of
well-established outcomes associated with these tradi-
tional actions. While Zwiebel’s model of conservatism
has been invoked in the movie literature to describe
managerial behavior (see the paragraph below), it is
important to note that other agency models also pre-
dict similar behavior. For example, Scharfstein and
Stein (1990) propose a model of herding with dif-
ferent information assumptions—in their model, both
owners and managers do not know managerial abil-
ity, whereas in Zwiebel’s model, only principals do
not know managerial ability. This results in a prefer-
ence to fail together rather than fail alone, and hence
in herding strategies rather than separating strategies.
Another important class of models that also result in
herding is signal-jamming models. For example, in
Holmström’s (1999) (see also Fudenberg and Tirole
1986) model, managers do not know their own ability.
Driven by career concerns, managers prefer strategies/
investments where failure can be attributed to external
circumstances rather than poormanagerial ability. This
also leads to herding in safe or traditional strategies.
As mentioned in the introduction, previous movie
studies have found evidence consistent with conser-
vatism in pretheatrical decision making. For example,
using reduced-form models, Ravid (1999) and Basuroy
et al. (2003) find that studios disproportionately use
actors with past record of success or “star power” to
improve movie revenues when movie quality (mea-
sured by critics’ ratings) is low even though star power
has no revenue impact for high-quality movies. As
Ravid (1999, p. 489) states, “The industry faces extreme
uncertainty and executives might simply be wished to
the ‘covered’ in case a project fails.” Orbach and Einav
(2007) study reasons for uniform pricing of movies
in theaters. They rule out fairness concerns, quality
uncertainty and unstable demand, and agency reasons
(among others) for this pricing. They conclude that
this pricing scheme is conservative and follows long-
standing tradition. Similarly, Einav (2010) finds evi-
dence of conservatism: studio executives herd in their
release decisions, to avoid the risk of being a lone
(unsuccessful) theatrical release in a nonpeak week.
While his model of both demand and supply is struc-
tural, his evidence for conservatism is that studios
release more movies in peak periods than is justified
by demand in peak weeks. Note that Einav finds evi-
dence for conservatism after structurally estimating
demand and supply, rather than by embedding within
structural estimation. We extend the standard model
of dynamic competitive behavior to measure if DVD
release decisions reflect a differential emphasis on the
revenue from different movies and consumers. As dis-
cussed in Section 6, we test for a variety of specifica-
tions (inside the structural supply estimation) to mea-
sure the presence and form of conservatism. Finally, we
contribute to the related empirical knowledge base by
measuring the consequences of conservatism for rev-
enues and release dates.
3. Data
Nielsen VideoScan collects purchase data from retail-
ers at the point of sale. We obtain weekly release
dates, units sold, and prices for all DVDs released
in the United States between 2000 and 2005, adjusted
for the universe of coverage. We use this period before
the rise of alternative posttheatrical distribution. We
Mukherjee and Kadiyali: The Competitive Dynamics of New DVD Releases
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use the Consumer Price Index in the United States to
deflate prices to be in December 2005 dollars. Between
2000 and 2005, our period of study, there were six
major DVD studios/distributors: Columbia, Disney,
Fox, Paramount, Universal, and Warner. We further
exclude from our sample three kinds of movies that are
unlikely to compete with larger movies: direct-to-DVD
movies, movies with limited theatrical success (movies
that grossed less than 10 million U.S. dollars in the-
atrical revenue), and older movies being rereleased on
DVD. These types of movies constitute a different mar-
ket outside of our new-movie release-timing game.
Each DVD has a short product lifecycle (Rennhoff
and Wilbur 2011), and each movie exerts greater com-
petitive pressure on other movies early in its lifecy-
cle. Hence, we focus on the first 13 weeks after DVD
release. We do not observe DVD releases prior to Jan-
uary 2000 (the release date is required to compute the
freshness of the movie). Therefore, we drop the first
12 weeks of market-share data when estimating the
demand model. We estimate our model on market-
share data of 808 DVDs sold over 300 weeks. In the
release-timing model, we drop movies that entered the
game in the first 13weeks of 2000 (to compute variables
needed for estimating the game) and estimate on data
from 730 movies across 299 weeks. Additionally, we
collect data on movie-specific descriptors (for exam-
ple, theatrical revenue). Finally, we use the monthly
sales of DVD players in the United States from 2000 to
2005, collected by the Consumer Electronics Associa-
tion, to construct themarket size in each period. Table 1
presents the descriptive statistics of the final sample.
Figure 1 illustrates seasonality in weekly DVD de-
mand. In Figure 1, we plot the logarithm of the aver-
age total weekly DVD revenue (averaged over the six
years of data in our data set). We include a LOESS
(nonparametric) regression to depict the cyclicality in
sales over the year. Figure 1 shows that DVD demand
is strongly seasonal with large predictable variations
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Number
of DVDs Theatrical to Theatrical
Studio released DVD releasea Priceb revenuec
Columbia 159 20.41 (5.27) 18.41 (1.74) 55.58 (55.18)
Disney 141 24.43 (6.48) 18.68 (1.91) 68.89 (62.25)
Fox 92 23.44 (5.86) 18.76 (2.85) 64.83 (70.97)
Paramount 77 23.28 (4.18) 19.94 (2.68) 58.08 (40.60)
Universal 145 23.49 (6.16) 18.49 (1.74) 72.90 (66.63)
Warner 168 22.63 (5.49) 18.22 (1.61) 62.75 (70.20)
Other studios 26 19.96 (2.68) 17.87 (1.66) 23.34 (15.01)
Industry 808 22.74 (5.80) 18.60 (2.06) 62.80 (62.65)
Note. Average values, with standard deviations in parentheses.
aNumber of weeks between theatrical and DVD release.
bIn U.S. dollars.
cIn millions of U.S. dollars.
Figure 1. (Color online) Seasonality in New DVD Revenue
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Notes. Average of the logarithm of the total weekly revenue of new
DVD releases. LOESS regression and associated standard errors.
over the course of a year. Figure 2 describes the ob-
served density of DVD releases for each studio over
the course of the calendar year. Figure 2 shows that
while Universal focuses on the holiday season, smaller
studios (grouped under “Other studios”) stay away
from releasing DVDs in this period. Further, Disney’s
Figure 2. Seasonality in New DVD Release Dates
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Note. Density of new DVD releases, by studio, averaged across
2000–2005.
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releases focus on the earlierweeks of the holiday season
whileColumbia focuses on the lastweeks of the holiday
season. The difference in release date choices is likely
drivenbybothdifferences indemandseasonality for the
studios’ products (e.g., animation movie DVDs might
havedifferent seasonality than actionmovieDVDs) and
differences in studios’ focus on demand from different
consumer segments. This points to the need for studio-
specific (i.e., asymmetric) payoff functions.
Figure 3 plots the ratio of total DVD revenue to total
theatrical revenue, with time since theatrical release.
Note that Figure 3 does not account for seasonality.
As DVD releases are delayed to target higher-demand
weeks, the estimate of the impact of freshness of prof-
its is positively biased in Figure 3. Therefore, this is a
conservative test of the negative impact of freshness on
DVD revenue. However, Figure 3 shows a strong nega-
tive relationship between freshness and DVD revenue,
indicating that freshness is likely a major force in the
release decision calculus of studios.
Figure 4 plots the weekly revenue of each DVD, each
week after release, expressed as a percentage of the
revenue in the release week. We include a generalized
additive model (nonparametric) regression to capture
the average change in revenue after release. Figure 4
provides strong evidence that DVD revenues decrease
steeply after release: on average, revenue in week 13
is 4% of the revenue in week 1. Figure 5 plots the
weekly prices of each DVD, expressed as a percentage
Figure 3. (Color online) Decrease in Revenue After
Theatrical Release
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The color of the bubble corresponds to the theatrical revenue of the
movie. Regression and associated standard errors.
Figure 4. (Color online) Decrease in Revenue After
DVD Release
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percentage of the quantity sold of the DVD in the first week after
release. The color of the bubble corresponds to the number of DVDs
sold. Nonparametric regression and associated standard errors.
of the average price of the DVD. Figure 5 shows that
there is no similar decrease in prices post DVD release.
Thus, consumers lack an incentive to strategically wait
to purchase a DVD in future periods (leading to the
sharp decrease in sales after release, as seen in Fig-
ure 4). Hence, we do not model consumers as being
forward looking.
4. Demand for DVDs
4.1. Model Specification
We build on the aggregate latent class multinomial
logit model (see Besanko et al. 2003 andHess et al. 2011
for a discussion of robustness). In more recent applica-
tions, Berry and Jia (2010), Soysal and Krishnamurthi
(2012), and Pattabhiramaiah et al. (2018) use similar
models to study consumer preferences in the airlines,
fashion, and print newspaper industry, respectively.
We model the indirect utility (udsw) of a consumer in
segment s purchasing a DVD d in week w as2
udsw(Dsw)Tdsw+βDsDsw+βps log(pdw)+βTRs log(TRd)
+βIMDbs IMDbd+βxsxd+ξdw+εdsw , (1)
Mukherjee and Kadiyali: The Competitive Dynamics of New DVD Releases
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Figure 5. (Color online) Price After DVD Release
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Notes. Weekly price of a DVD, expressed as a percentage of the price
of the DVD in the first week after release. The color of the bubble
corresponds to the price of the DVD. Regression and associated stan-
dard errors.
where Dsw is a dummy indicating if the consumer
purchased a DVD in the last period, Tdsw is the time-
varying component of utility, pdw is the price, TRd is the
theatrical revenue, IMDBd the rating of the movie on
the InternetMovie Database (IMDb),3 and xd is a vector
of dummies indicating the genre, if the DVD is rated R,
if the DVD is animated, and the studio that produced
the movie. βDs is a state dependence parameter that
indicates if a consumer obtains utility/disutility from
purchasing a DVD in a period if they also purchased
a DVD in the preceding period, βps is the price sensi-
tivity parameter, βTRs is the responsiveness of the seg-
ment to past theatrical success, βIMDbs is the responsive-
ness of the segment to the rating on IMDb, and βxs is
a vector of genre, R rating, animated status, and stu-
dio fixed effects. ξdw accounts for unobserved week-
specific DVD quality, while εdsw (independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gumbel) accounts for any
remaining DVD-, segment- and week-specific idiosyn-
cratic variations in the evaluation of a DVD. To set
scale, we model the indirect utility (u0sw  ε0sw) of a
consumer in segment s choosing the outside option in
week w as i.i.d. Gumbel.
We model the time-varying component of utility
(Tdsw) as consisting of an intercept, year-specific fixed
effects, a periodic (seasonal) change in the preference
for buying DVDs, and a weekly decline in utility as
the DVD loses its freshness, after release. Following
Livera et al. (2011), we approximate the seasonal com-
ponent (the periodic change) by its Fourier series. The
Fourier series is a useful approximation for functions
as, under mild regularity conditions, the Fourier series
converges to a true (periodic) function. Parseval’s the-
orem implies that the Fourier series polynomial is
the unique best trigonometric polynomial approxima-
tion to a true (periodic) function. Extant papers use
week-specific fixed effects to control for seasonality in
preferences (see Einav 2007 for a discussion). Extend-
ing the fixed-effects–based model to track heteroge-
neous seasonal preferences places large demands on
the data, with week-specific instruments required for
week- and segment-specific fixed effects. Consequently,
prior studies modeled consumers as being homoge-
neous in the seasonality of their preference for buying
a DVD (cf. Chiou 2008, Mukherjee and Kadiyali 2011).
The orthonormal basis of sine and cosine waves is a
general, robust, and parsimonious way to capture sea-
sonal variation in preferences. To account for the last
component—freshness—we include the length of time
between theatrical and DVD release and the length of
time since DVD release. Specifically, we model Tdsw as
Tdsw  β1s + βy +
H∑
h1
(
ahs sin
(
2pihr
52
)
+ bhs cos
(
2pihr
52
))
+ βWBs log(WBd)+ βWRs log(WRdw), (2)
where β1s is a segment-specific intercept, βy is a year-
specific fixed effect, ahs and bhs are the Fourier coeffi-
cients, WBd is the number of weeks between theatrical
and DVD release, and WRdw is the number of weeks
since DVD release, while βWBs and βWRs are coefficients
on the last two terms, respectively. H is the number of
harmonics of the fundamental frequency (correspond-
ing to annual periodicity) included in the model, r is w
modulo 52, the specific week of the year, and y is the
year to which w corresponds. Increasing H improves
the approximation at the cost of increasing the number
of estimated parameters. Our formulation allows for
segment-specific heterogeneity on all attributes (aver-
age propensity to purchase a DVD, state dependence,
price, theatrical revenue, freshness, and seasonality).
Note that state dependence is category-level and
not product-level. In a model with product-specific
state dependence, computing the market-share func-
tion requires knowledge of a consumer’s complete pur-
chase history. As the state space must span all pos-
sible combinations of prior purchases, the cardinality
of the state space has exponential order in the num-
ber of available alternatives. This is computationally
intractable in our context due to the large number
of DVD releases. To reduce the computational bur-
den, some prior studies have treated purchase deci-
sions over different products as being independent
(Luan and Sudhir 2007). However, these models do
not account for what other products (excluding the
focal product) were purchased in prior periods. This
Mukherjee and Kadiyali: The Competitive Dynamics of New DVD Releases
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assumption is particularly restrictive in our study since
the weekly changing set of competing alternatives is an
important driver of DVD revenues and hence release-
date choices.
Following Berry et al. (1995), we treat measuredmar-
ket shares as being analogous to population proba-
bilities. As is common for aggregate logit models, we
assume that each consumer chooses one good (inclu-
sive of an outside option), in each week.4 Let Fsw rep-
resent the proportion of the consumers in a segment
that purchased a DVD in the week prior to w—i.e., in
week, w − 1. Fsw is unobserved in our demand model.
We infer Fsw from the cumulative probability of con-
sumers in a segment purchasing any DVD in the prior
period:
Fs(w+1)Fsw
∑
d∈w
exp(udsw(Dsw1))
1+∑i∈w exp(uisw(Dsw1))
+(1−Fsw)
∑
d∈w
exp(udsw(Dsw0))
1+∑i∈w exp(uisw(Dsw0)) , (3)
where w denotes the set of DVDs available for pur-
chase in week w, udsw(Dsw  1) is the utility from pur-
chasing DVD d to a consumer in segment s who pur-
chased a DVD in the preceding period (i.e., w − 1),
and udsw(Dsw  0) is the utility from purchasing DVD d
to a consumer in segment s who did not purchase a
DVD in the preceding period (i.e., w−1). The segment-
specificmarket share of DVD d in segment s, inweekw,
mktshdsw , where udsw is the utility to a consumer in seg-
ment s and wis the choice set of DVDs available for
purchase, is
mktshdsw Fsw
exp(udsw(Dsw 1))
1+∑i∈w exp(uisw(Dsw 1))
+ (1−Fsw)
exp(udsw(Dsw 0))
1+∑i∈w exp(uisw(Dsw 0)) . (4)
The total market share is the weighted sum of the
segment-specific market shares, weighted by the class
allocation probabilities:
mktshdw 
∑
s∈S
Psmktshdsw , (5)
where Ps is the fraction of consumers who are a mem-
ber of segment s, and S is the set of all segments. The
measured share is constructed from the quantity of
DVD dpurchased in week w and the total market size
(the number of households that own DVD players in
the United States in week w).
State dependence is identified through both changes
in the set of DVDs released and the seasonality of con-
sumer preferences over the course of the year. In a
week, the set of DVDs available and seasonality drive
the probability of purchase, and hence the fraction of
purchasing consumers in each segment. The variation
in the available set of DVDs and the seasonality in pref-
erences induces a variation in the fraction of consumers
who purchase DVDs across weeks. This allows for
the identification of category-level state dependence.
A parallel argument can be found in Einav (2007)
where the identification of market expansion rests on
seasonality in preferences in the theatrical channel and
choice sets, and in Horsky et al. (2012) where the
identification of state dependence rests on longitudi-
nal changes in the marketing mix, and hence purchase
likelihoods, of different brands.
We draw on the arguments of Einav (2007) and
Chiou (2008) in formulating our instrumentation strat-
egy. There is a long lead time between when studios
make release decisions and a release date, with many
intervening DVD releases. Hence, it is unlikely that
movie-specific differences in freshness sensitivity sig-
nificantly impact release timing. If the release deci-
sions of studios do not materially depend on such
idiosyncratic differences in freshness sensitivity, then
as the structural errors are by construction orthogonal
to preference seasonality and attributes, the structural
errors are orthogonal to aggregate market character-
istics (for example, the number of recently released
DVDs), which can hence be used as instruments in
the demand model. Controlling for seasonality, what
drives variation in aggregate market characteristics?
The movie production process is long and unpre-
dictable. The variation in the nature and number of
movies produced causes exogenous interyear varia-
tion in the market characteristics. Thus, the structure
of the entertainment market allows us to construct the
following instruments: for each studio, in each week,
the count, and the mean and the variance (first two
moments) of the prior theatrical revenue, number of
weeks between theatrical and DVD release, numbers of
weeks since DVD release, and price, of DVDs available
for purchase.
4.2. Demand Model Estimates
Weuse the generalizedmethod ofmoments to estimate
the model (the estimation algorithm is described in
Appendix A). For parsimony, we test for model compo-
nents sequentially. In the two-segment model, we find
that the data support using the first seven harmonics
of the fundamental frequency (wemodel seasonality as
having annual periodicity) tomodel seasonality in con-
sumer preferences, as the coefficients on the eighth har-
monic are not jointly significant. Next, we increase the
number of consumer segments in the model. We find
the class allocation probabilities are not jointly signifi-
cant in the three-segment model. Therefore, the three-
segment model is not supported in the data. We find
that the data support the inclusion of homogeneous
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studio fixed effects in the utility function. However, the
heterogeneity coefficients on the studio fixed effects are
jointly not significant.
A consumer segment comprising of 54% of the con-
sumers is comparatively freshness sensitive in its DVD
demand while the other segment is comparatively
freshness insensitive. These segments differ (statisti-
cally significantly) on the mean propensity to buy a
movie on DVD, responsiveness to price, theatrical suc-
cess, freshness, consumer rating, and measures of con-
tent such as the MPAA rating of the movie, its genre,
and if the movie is animated or live-action. Table 2
reports the coefficient estimates for all segments.
We find that the larger segment is more respon-
sive to prior theatrical success than the smaller seg-
ment. Further, the larger segment has a stronger pref-
erence for action/adventure, animated, family, and
mystery/suspense movies, and for movies rated R,
while the smaller segment is more sensitive to the
IMDb rating of the movie. A possible segment mem-
bership structure might be as follows: the larger seg-
ment might include households with children, while
the smaller segment might include households with-
out children. The larger segment might be more driven
by the immediate consumption of (mainstream) enter-
tainment, while the smaller segment might be more
interested in collecting select DVDs. The larger seg-
ment shows negative state dependence; this is consis-
tent with preferring to purchase DVDs irregularly. The
smaller segment shows positive state dependence; this
is consistent with consumers who have collections, and
hence with habit formation.
Figure 6 plots the expected utility of each segment
in the fourth quarter of a calendar year (the holi-
day season). The freshness-sensitive consumers obtain
higher utility from purchasing when a large assort-
ment of blockbusters (movies that were highly suc-
cessful in theaters) are available in the choice set.
However, studios wait to release summer blockbusters
close to the holiday quarter. The relative staleness
of these delayed releases reduces demand from the
freshness-sensitive consumers. Expectedly, freshness-
insensitive consumers benefit from the improved set of
new releases.
We find strong statistical support for the model and
the instrumentation strategy. The J-test admits the
null of instrument validity (we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the model is valid; p > 0.1). The par-
tial F-statistic of excluded instrument strength exceeds
the accepted cutoff of 20. Additionally, we test instru-
ments derived of theatrical revenue and price (the two
variables most related to seasonality). We drop instru-
ments derived of these variables, both sequentially
and then simultaneously. The difference in J-statistics
between the models estimated using the unrestricted
and restricted set of instruments is a strict test of the
Table 2. Demand Model Estimates (N  9,892)
Freshness- Freshness-
sensitive insensitive
segment segment
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant −72.87∗∗∗ (1.37) −16.49 (12.10)
Price sensitivity −4.21∗∗∗ (0.42) −3.30∗∗∗ (0.52)
Theatrical revenue 1.46∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.79∗∗∗ (0.03)
IMDb rating 0.09∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.04)
Theatrical to DVD release −0.97∗∗∗ (0.16) −0.45∗∗ (0.22)
Weeks since DVD release −1.56∗∗∗ (0.02) −1.28∗∗∗ (0.04)
Rated R 1.43∗∗∗ (0.05) −0.08 (0.07)
Animated 3.65∗∗∗ (0.20) 0.83∗∗∗ (0.29)
Seasonality
Sine (h  1) 34.71∗∗∗ (0.26) −29.38∗ (17.80)
Cosine (h  1) 18.74∗∗∗ (0.23) −23.48 (15.30)
Sine (h  2) 42.67∗∗∗ (0.24) −33.96 (20.80)
Cosine (h  2) −13.92∗∗∗ (0.24) 7.04∗ (3.75)
Sine (h  3) 9.54∗∗∗ (0.29) −12.07 (9.31)
Cosine (h  3) −13.98∗∗∗ (0.18) 25.84∗ (14.80)
Sine (h  4) 37.44∗∗∗ (0.25) 9.21∗ (4.82)
Cosine (h  4) −2.83∗∗∗ (0.24) 19.74 (12.40)
Sine (h  5) −3.16∗∗∗ (0.24) 15.42∗ (8.34)
Cosine (h  5) 38.78∗∗∗ (0.24) 2.11 (3.87)
Sine (h  6) 13.59∗∗∗ (0.21) 6.01 (4.51)
Cosine (h  6) −14.75∗∗∗ (0.26) −6.48∗∗ (3.09)
Sine (h  7) −2.52∗∗∗ (0.22) −2.01∗ (1.20)
Cosine (h  7) 15.04∗∗∗ (0.25) −5.16∗∗ (2.50)
Genre
Action/adventure 2.76∗∗∗ (0.29) −1.11∗∗∗ (0.42)
Comedy 3.62∗∗∗ (0.29) −1.66∗∗∗ (0.43)
Drama 3.04∗∗∗ (0.28) −1.54∗∗∗ (0.42)
Family 0.87∗∗∗ (0.32) −0.98∗∗ (0.47)
Horror 2.67∗∗∗ (0.34) −1.72∗∗∗ (0.50)
Mystery/suspense 2.82∗∗∗ (0.31) −1.49∗∗∗ (0.44)
Studio
Columbia −0.13∗ (0.08) −0.13∗ (0.08)
Disney −0.05 (0.10) −0.05 (0.10)
Paramount −0.05 (0.11) −0.05 (0.11)
Fox 0.03 (0.09) 0.03 (0.09)
Universal −0.17 (0.08)∗∗ −0.17∗∗ (0.08)
Warner −0.10 (0.08) −0.10 (0.08)
Year
2001 −0.44 (0.47) −0.44 (0.47)
2002 −0.81∗ (0.47) −0.81∗ (0.47)
2003 −1.16∗∗ (0.48) −1.16∗∗ (0.48)
2004 −1.60∗∗∗ (0.46) −1.60∗∗∗ (0.46)
2005 −2.01∗∗∗ (0.47) −2.01∗∗∗ (0.47)
State dependence −6.66∗∗∗ (0.01) 5.11∗∗∗ (0.01)
Segment size 0.54∗∗∗ (0.19) 0.46∗∗∗ (0.19)
Note. Coeff., coefficient; S.E., standard error; all tests two sided.
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
exogeneity of the set of restricted instruments. In all
cases, the difference in J-statistics does not reject the
null of the exogeneity of the restricted subset of instru-
ments (p > 0.1). Further, in all cases, our substantive
conclusions remain unchanged. Finally, we also ana-
lyze the fit of the demandmodel. Figure 7 plots a histo-
gram of the difference between the observed and fitted
market shares. Figure 7 shows that the fitted shares
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Figure 6. (Color online) Seasonality in Utility to the Consumer
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Note. Expected utility of buying a new DVD, normed by the absolute median utility.
Figure 7. Fit of Demand Model
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Note. Histogram of the difference between the observed and the fit-
ted market shares.
providing a reasonable approximation of the observed
market shares, with symmetric and unbiased errors.
5. DVD Release Timing Model
5.1. Model Notation
The followingnotation (inorderof appearance in theex-
position) is used in the model. Given DVD d, studio f ,
segment s, andweek w,
• ϕ  {ϕ f sdw} is a vector of coefficients that captures
the objective function of studios;
• qdsw describes the quantity of DVD d purchased
by segment s in week w;
• 0 ≤ r < 1 is a discount factor;
• xd are the attributes of DVD d;
• pd  {pdw}is the vector of prices of DVD d;
• δw is the state vector in week w;
• υd  {υdw} is the vector of private information
shocks across the planning horizon, with density
denoted by dν;
• µpd(xd , δw) is the conditional distribution of prices
(conditional on DVD attributes and the state vector)
with density given by dµpd(xd , δw);
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• ad(w ,w+1,...) is the vector of actions of DVD d across
the planning horizon;
• Ψd(w+ j)(δw+ j | δw , ad(w ,w+1,...)) is the law of motion
(conditional distribution) of the state vector in period
w + j with density, dΨd(w+ j)(δw+ j | δw , ad(w ,w+1,...));
• w is the set of released DVDs and Ξwis the set of
potential entrants in week w.
5.2. Studio Objective Function
To capture the resulting heterogeneity in studios’ objec-
tive functions, we model ex post payoffs from releasing
DVD d in week t to studio (firm) f as below (see
Section 6 for details):
pi
post
f d (ϕ, t , xd , pd , δs , υd)

∑
s∈S
ϕ f sdt rev
post
ds (t , xd , pd , δs)︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
Common Knowledge
+ υdt︸︷︷︸
Private
Information
, (6)
where revpostds (t , xd , pd , δs) is the (discounted) ex post
revenue of DVD d from segment s. Following Gallant
et al. (2018), we assume a weekly discount factor cor-
responding to an internal rate of return of 20% over
the planning horizon. As sales of DVDs 13 weeks after
release are (on average) 4% of sales in the first week
after release (see Figure 3), we use the discounted sales
from the first 13weeks after release to capture segment-
specific DVD revenues:
pi
post
f d (ϕ, t ,xd ,pd , δs , υd)

∑
s∈S
ϕ f sdt
t+12∑
jt
r j−tpdjqds j(t ,xd ,pdj , δs j)︸                                        ︷︷                                        ︸
Common Knowledge
+ υdt︸︷︷︸
Private
Information
, (7)
where qds j  mktshds jM j is the expected quantity of
DVD d purchased by segment s in week j.
5.3. Description of the Game
Studios compete in a repeated game of incomplete
information. Eachweek, studios simultaneously decide
the DVD release date of movies that have ended a
period of exclusive theatrical distribution (eight weeks
after theatrical release),within afiniteplanninghorizon
(26 weeks after theatrical exclusivity). Studio release
choices are final. The ex post payoff in Equation (7)
reflects the information set at the end of the game. The
first component contains variables that are common
knowledge, while the second component contains pri-
vate information. Studio beliefs on future prices (µpd)
reflect the observed conditional distribution of prices.
Studio beliefs on the evolution of the state vector
({Ψd(w+ j)}38j1) are consistent with rational play and the
information set at the time of decisionmaking.
The state vector is composed of four elements (given
our findings of two consumer segments): the two
segment-specific inclusive values of the choice set of
DVDs (w) and the two segment-specific inclusive
values of the set of potential entrants (Ξw). In the
GEV RUM model, the inclusive value accounts for
the impact of rivals’ actions on demand. The inclu-
sive value is an aggregative statistic in the release
timing game as it allows for a computation of pay-
offs, without further knowledge of rivals’ actions (see
Gowrisankaran et al. 2010, Schiraldi 2011, Nevo and
Rossi 2010). The inclusive values account for (a) het-
erogeneous seasonally varying consumer preferences,
(b) differentiation across products in several attributes
including freshness, and (c) seasonally varying release
strategies. The inclusive value of prior DVD releases
reflects current competition. The inclusive value of
the current entrants reflects anticipated competition
in future periods. Thus, the inclusive values parsimo-
niously capture high dimensionality attribute space.
Let FS represent the freshness-sensitive segment and FI
represent the freshness-insensitive segment. The state
vector is
δw 
{
log
(∑
i∈w
exp(uiFSw)
)
, log
(∑
i∈w
exp(uiFIw)
)
,
log
(∑
i∈Ξw
exp(ƐuiFSw)
)
, log
(∑
i∈Ξw
exp(ƐuiFIw)
)}
. (8)
The state vector evolves as a first-order time-non-
homogeneous Markov process. Ψd(w+1)(δw+1 | δw ,
ad(w ,w+1,...)) describes the conditional distribution (tran-
sition kernel) of the state vector in week w + 1 given
the state vector in week w and the release decision
of DVD d. In the release-timing game, there are two
sources of time nonhomogeneity. First, the inclusive
value of current period entrants evolves as a first-order
time-nonhomogeneous Markov process, reflecting a
(time-nonhomogeneous) MPE in theatrical release
dates. Second, the DVD-release-timing policy function
is time-nonhomogeneous Markov. We limit both the
endogenous and exogenous components of the transi-
tion kernel to being periodic (time nonhomogeneous)
with year-specific discontinuities. Studio beliefs on
the distribution of the state vector in period w + j
are described by the iterated Markov kernel denoted
by Ψd(w+ j)(δw+ j | δw , ad(w ,w+1,...)), j  2, . . . , 38.5 By the
Chapman–Kolmogorov equation, the density of the
iteratedMarkov kernel is defined recursively:
dΨd(w+i+1)(δw+i+1 | δw , ad(w ,w+1,...))

∫
dΨd(w+i+1)(δw+i+1 | δw+i , ad(w ,w+1,...))
· dΨd(w+i)(δw+i | δw , ad(w ,w+1,...)),
for i  {1, . . . , 37}. (9)
In our model, private information reflects the idio-
syncratic inclination of a studio to favor a release date
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(or not releasing the movie on DVD) for a focal movie.
That is, private information pertains to the match, con-
ditional on observables, between a candidate release
date, and the specific DVD. Hence, accounting for
the revenue implications of a DVD’s attributes, pri-
vate information reflects the idiosyncratic inclination
of a studio to favor a release date (or not releasing
the movie on DVD) for a focal movie. For example,
in setting release dates, studio may factor in the cal-
endar availability of the actors and the director of the
movie to appear on talk shows to generate interest in
the movie. This information is unlikely to be available
to, or factored into the calculations of, other studios.
We model private information on payoffs from re-
lease dates and from the outside option of not releasing
the movie on DVD. These are distributed i.i.d. Gumbel.
Studios learn their private information for all weeks of
the planning horizon at the time of setting DVD release
dates when a movie has ended its period of theatri-
cal exclusivity. The distribution of private information
is common knowledge. The evolution of the state vec-
tor is conditionally independent (given player actions
and the current state) of private information. These
assumptions are common in the empirical literature as
they lead to a tractable form for the equilibrium distri-
bution of the strategic choices in a game (c.f. Srisuma
2013, p. 553). The assumption is reasonable in our con-
text since the movie attributes are highly informative
and seasonality plays a focal role in the release-timing
game. However, if studios’ private information were
correlated rather than independent, the model would
also need to account for signaling and learning.
To investigate cannibalization, we conduct the fol-
lowing analysis. For all pairs of DVDs, we regress
the period between DVD release dates on a dummy
indicating if the movie belonged to the same stu-
dio (see Table 3). If studios act to avoid cannibaliza-
tion, two DVDs from the same studio, on average,
will have release dates that are further apart than two
DVDs from different studios. However, despite con-
siderable statistical power, the test is unable to reject
the null. Therefore, the data suggests that studios do
not account for cannibalization when making DVD
release decisions. This supports our empirical model
that abstracts from cannibalization.
Table 3. Time Between DVD Release Dates of Movies
(N  328,454)
Coeff. S.E.
Intercept 104.41∗∗∗ 0.14
Same studio 0.04 0.35
Note. Coeff., coefficient; S.E., standard error; all tests two sided.
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
5.4. Time-Nonhomogeneous MPE
We focus on pure strategy equilibria since they are
observationally equivalent to mixed strategy equilib-
ria.6 A strategy is a function of common knowledge
and private information to a specific action (release
date), denoted by ad(w ,w+1,...). For example, for a focal
DVD d that enters the release timing game in week w,
a strategy (σd), given common knowledge and private
information, is
σd(xd , µpd , δw , νd) ad(w ,w+1,...). (10)
The best response function, denoted by BRd , maps
rivals’ strategies (denoted by σ−d) to the strategy that
maximizes the player’s payoffs. As the actions of rivals
are described by the iterated kernel, the best response
strategy to σ−d can be written as the best response strat-
egy to {Ψd(w+ j)}38j1, the iterated kernel formed by σ−d :
BRd(ϕ, xd , µpd , σ−d , δw , νd)
 BRd
(
ϕ, xd , µpd , {Ψd(w+ j)}38j1 , δw , νd
)
. (11)
Define ex ante revenues, revanteds ( j, xd , µpd ,Ψd(w+ j) , δw ,
ad(w ,w+1,...)), to be the expected revenue of DVD d
from segment s in a future period j (where w is
the week DVD d enters the release-timing game and
ad(w ,w+1,...)identifies w + t, the week a movie is released
on DVD):
revanteds ( j, xd , µpd ,Ψd(w+ j) , δw , ad(w ,w+1,...))

∫ ∫
pdjqds j(t , xd , pdj , δw+ j) dµpd(xd , δw+ j)
· dΨd(w+ j)(δw+ j | δw , ad(w ,w+1,...)). (12)
The ex ante payoffs to studios from releasing the
DVD d in a future period t, net of private information
(υdt), are
piantef d
(
ϕ, t , xd , µpd , {Ψd(w+ j)}38j1 , δw
)

∑
s∈S
ϕ f sdt
t+12∑
jt
r jrevanteds ( j, xd , µpd ,Ψd(w+ j) , δw , ad(w ,w+1,...)).
(13)
The best response strategy for the DVD d (that enters
the game in week w) is
BRd
(
ϕ, xd , µpd , {Ψd(w+ j)}38j1 , δw , νd
)
 arg max
0<t<27
{
piantef d (ϕ, t , xd , µpd , {Ψd(w+ j)
}38
j1 , δw)+ υdt , 0}.
(14)
At equilibrium, actors play the best response strategy
to the strategies of their rivals. Let σ∗d denote equilib-
rium strategies. Then,
σ∗d  BRd(ϕ, xd , µpd , σ∗−d , δw , νd)
 BRd
(
ϕ, xd , µpd , {Ψ∗d(w+ j)}38j1 , δw , νd
)
, ∀ d , (15)
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where {Ψ∗d(w+ j)}38j1 are rational beliefs on future states
due to the equilibrium strategies (σ∗−d) of rivals.
A studio observes only its own private information.
The expectation of a player’s strategy with respect to
its private information shocks is the ex ante (prior to
the studio learning its private information) probability
of the player’s actions, given common information and
rivals strategies. For any set of rival strategies, the best
response strategy implies a corresponding ex ante best
response probability. The ex ante equilibriumprobabil-
ity is the expectation of the best response strategy with
respect to the private information, given the iterated
kernel corresponding to equilibrium rivals’ strategies.
Specifically, the equilibrium probability that DVD d
is released corresponding to the action ad(w ,w+1,...) is
given by
Pr∗d(ad(w ,w+1,...))

∫
1
(
BRd(ϕ, xd , µpd , {Ψ∗d(w+ j)}38j1 , δw , νd)
 ad(w ,w+1,...)
)
dν, (16)
where 1( ) is the indicator function. The ex ante equi-
librium release probabilities (Pr∗d) span a convex com-
pact subset of the Euclidean space and are continuous
with respect to rival’s equilibrium release probabili-
ties. Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem implies that a fixed
point (an MPE) exists. Firms’ beliefs over the state vec-
tor are then perfect Bayesian: the anticipated condi-
tional distribution of states in future periods is consis-
tent with equilibrium play, given the current state of
the game.
5.5. Estimating the Release-Timing Model
We adapt the estimation strategy of conditional
choice probability (CCP) estimators (Bajari et al.
2007, Arcidiacono and Miller 2011), to the release-
timing game. Conditional on the equilibrium played
in the data, CCP estimators recover and model the
best responses of individual players. From (16), the
likelihood of a seeing a movie d that entered the game
in week w being released on DVD in w + t is given by
L f d(t , xd , µˆpd , {Ψˆd(w+ j)}38j1 , δw ;ϕ)

exp(piantef d (ϕ, t , xd , µˆpd , {Ψˆd(w+ j)}38j1 , δw))
1+∑26k1 exp(piantef d (ϕ, k , xd , µˆpd , {Ψˆd(w+ j)}38j1 , δw)) , (17)
where 〈µˆpd , {Ψˆd(w+ j)}38j1〉 are empirical analogs of the
equilibrium distributions, recovered as described in
Appendix B.
6. Competition in the U.S. DVD Industry
We first estimate a baseline model in which stu-
dios equally weight revenues from different con-
sumers and different movies. We parameterize possi-
ble drivers of managerial conservatism in managers’
objective function. Therefore, in addition to the base-
line model, we sequentially estimate the following
models to capture potential dimensions of managerial
conservatism:
(a) Consumer segments: Given the consumer segment
differences in responsiveness to prior theatrical rev-
enues, we first test if the studios focus more/less on
different consumer segments as suggested by man-
agerial conservatism. We estimate a model where the
weights vary by segment but not by studio. We find
that the data supports a difference in weights across
the segments (the likelihood ratio test rejects the null,
p < 0.05).
(b) Movie studios: As studios are heterogeneous, we
test if our prior findings vary by studio. We estimate
a model where the weights vary by both segment and
studio. The data support a differential consumer focus
by studio (the likelihood ratio test rejects the null,
p < 0.05).
(c) Time: There may have been changes in manage-
rial behavior over time. Therefore, we estimate the fol-
lowing models. (1) Weights vary by studio and by time
(in the first versus the second half of the data period).
(2) Weights vary by studio and consumer segment, and
by time (in the first versus the second half of the data
period). (3) Weights vary by consumer segment and
annually. (4) Weights vary by studio, consumer seg-
ment, and annually. In all four cases, we find that the
data do not support time-varying weights (in all four
cases, the likelihood ratio test does not reject the null,
p > 0.1).
(d) Movies: A movie’s prior theatrical success is
likely to influence managerial (and investor) expec-
tation of DVD success—movies that did well in the
theatrical channel might well be expected to do well
in DVD channels. Therefore, we estimate three mod-
els where segment weights vary across movies as a
linear, quadratic, and cubic function of theatrical rev-
enues. We find that the data supports a model where
weights vary as a quadratic function of theatrical rev-
enues. The likelihood ratio test rejects the null when
testing against simplermodels (bothwhereweights are
symmetric across movies and where weights vary as a
linear function of theatrical revenues, p < 0.05). How-
ever, the likelihood ratio does not reject the null when
testing the model where weights vary as a cubic func-
tion of theatrical revenues (p > 0.1).
(e) Interaction: We estimate three models where seg-
ments weights vary as a quadratic function of the-
atrical revenues interacted with fixed effects indicating
the studio, the first versus the second half of the data
period, and the year. In all cases, the data does not sup-
port the model additions: the likelihood ratio test does
not reject the null (p > 0.1).
Our findings (Table 4 reports model estimates) sug-
gest that studios focus on consumers who are more
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Table 4. Release Timing Model Estimates (N  730)
Studios Coeff. S.E.
Freshness-sensitive Theatrical revenue −8.21∗∗∗ (2.12)
segment (Theatrical revenue)2 14.28∗∗∗ (5.34)
Columbia 0.61∗∗ (0.24)
Disney 1.09∗∗∗ (0.25)
Fox 0.95∗∗∗ (0.20)
Paramount 1.31∗∗∗ (0.29)
Universal 1.15∗∗∗ (0.19)
Warner 0.97∗∗∗ (0.21)
Other studios 2.07∗∗ (0.70)
Freshness-insensitive Theatrical revenue −5.10 (3.12)
segment (Theatrical revenue)2 8.04 (8.52)
Columbia 1.04∗∗∗ (0.30)
Disney 1.31∗∗∗ (0.36)
Fox 1.13∗∗∗ (0.26)
Paramount 2.69∗∗∗ (0.40)
Universal 1.41∗∗∗ (0.28)
Warner 1.21∗∗∗ (0.26)
Other studios 2.32∗ (1.19)
Note. Coeff., coefficient; S.E., standard error; all tests two sided.
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Figure 8. (Color online) Observed and Fitted Density of Weeks Between Theatrical and DVD Release
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Notes. Histogram of the observed distribution of weeks between theatrical and DVD release by studio. Overlay of the fitted probability and
associated standard errors.
box-office sensitive, and focusmore on the revenue con-
siderations of larger than smaller (by prior theatrical
revenue) movies. Figure 8 provides a visual summary
of the fit of our model by comparing the observed and
predicteddensities of time between theatrical and DVD
release dates.7 Note that the model provides a reason-
able fit. Importantly, note that the model accounts for
the firm asymmetries in release strategies (for exam-
ple, compare the release strategies of Paramount and
Warner).
As mentioned earlier, a limitation in the current
empirical literature on conservatism is that estima-
tion has used approaches that do not provide insights
in to drivers of managerial conservatism. For exam-
ple, Einav (2010) estimates studios optimizing regu-
lar maximands and finds excessive crowding in peak
release weekends. He interprets this crowding as con-
sistent with conservative equilibria. Therefore, he is
unable to simulate alternative equilibria since there are
no structural parameters governing the conservative
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Table 5. Expected Revenue in the Conservative Equilibrium
and Revenue Maximization (N  730)
∆ DVD revenue
Coeff. S.E.
Theatrical revenue −7.62∗∗∗ (0.70)
(Theatrical revenue)2 6.89∗∗∗ (2.26)
Columbia 0.14∗∗∗ (0.05)
Disney 0.32∗∗∗ (0.05)
Fox 0.08 (0.06)
Paramount 0.38∗∗∗ (0.06)
Universal 0.19∗∗∗ (0.05)
Warner 0.19∗∗∗ (0.05)
Other studios 0.25∗∗∗ (0.10)
R2 0.48
Note. “∆DVD revenue” denotes difference in DVD revenue between
the conservative equilibrium and revenue maximization; Coeff.,
coefficient; S.E., standard error; all tests two sided.
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
equilibrium. Other studies (Ravid 1999, Basuroy et al.
2003) have used reduced-form approaches. In contrast,
an advantage of our structural approach is the ability
to conduct counterfactuals of alternative equilibria.
We adopt the approach advocated by Aguirre-
gabiria and Ho (2012) to recursively compute the equi-
librium release probabilities corresponding to both
the observed equilibrium and one specific alterna-
tive equilibrium—revenue maximization—as it is the
default equilibrium estimated in the majority of the
structural industrial organization literature. Specifi-
cally, we first compute release strategies conditional
on the observed (probability of) play of competitors.
In successive iterations, we use the computed release
strategies in the prior iteration, to update the proba-
bility of play of all competitors and recompute release
strategies (we describe the steps of the algorithm in
Appendix C). The counterfactual thus accounts for the
endogenous evolution of play with changes in policy.
Table 5 reports the results of the following regres-
sion. The dependent variable is the difference in ex-
pected DVD revenues corresponding to the observed
equilibrium and revenue maximization. The explana-
tory variables are the linear and quadratic terms of the-
atrical revenues, and studio dummies. We find that the
Table 6. Summary Statistics of Expected DVD Releases in the Thanksgiving Period
Theatrical revenue Equilibrium Number of DVDs released Total theatrical gross of DVD releases
Highest quartile Conservative 1.90 304.2
Highest quartile Revenue maximization 1.78 285.2
Second-highest quartile Conservative 1.52 92.6
Second-highest quartile Revenue maximization 1.47 89.9
Second-lowest quartile Conservative 1.58 51.6
Second-lowest quartile Revenue maximization 1.38 45.8
Lowest quartile Conservative 1.54 26.3
Lowest quartile Revenue maximization 1.58 27.2
Note. Movies classified by prior theatrical revenues into quartiles; “Number of DVDs released” denotes expected number of new DVDs
released; “Total theatrical gross of DVD releases” denotes expected total prior theatrical gross of new DVD releases, in millions of U.S. dollars.
observed equilibrium leads to higher expected DVD
revenues for larger movies but lower expected DVD
revenues for smaller movies. This is as expected
since there is a greater weight on revenues from
larger movies. Note though this result is despite the
weight on freshness-sensitive customer segment,which
could also benefit small movies (if they are released
while fresh).
Next, we analyze these findings of greater revenues
of biggermovies by relating them to release timingdeci-
sions. We tabulate the expected number of releases in
Thanksgiving, the largest peak demand period in the
DVDmarket, by number and size ofmovie (see Table 6).
For the top three quartiles of movies, the observed
equilibrium results in more movies and larger movies
released in this peak demand period than in revenue
maximization equilibrium. For the bottomsize quartile,
fewer and smaller movies are released in the observed
equilibrium compared to revenue maximization equi-
librium.Overall, in this peak demand period,more and
larger movies are released in the observed equilibrium
compared to a revenuemaximization equilibrium. This
result is similar to Einav’s finding of more crowded
peak demand weeks in theatrical release. Our addi-
tional result of peak weeks being more crowded with
biggermovies comes fromparameterizing conservative
equilibria (i.e., allowing movie and segment weights
in objective function). Relating these findings to the
ones in the previous paragraph, the observed release
strategies increaseDVDrevenuesof largermovies at the
expense of the DVD revenues of smaller movies.
We now turn our attention to freshness sensitivity
and its impact on release dates and revenues of movies.
Freshness sensitivity lowers incentives of studios to
delay DVD release until a seasonal peak. Hence, fresh-
ness sensitivity reduces the number of releases in peak
weeks (i.e.,moreDVDs are likely released closer to their
theatrical release dates). However, in the competitive
release timing game, lower crowding in peak weeks
increases the incentives of studios to wait for a peak
week, in turn increasing the number of releases (crowd-
ing) in peakweeks. Hence, it hard to predict a priori the
net effect of freshness sensitivity on equilibrium release
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Table 7. Impact of Freshness on DVD Revenue (N  730)
∆ DVD revenue
Coeff. S.E.
Theatrical revenue −32.60∗∗∗ (3.25)
(Theatrical revenue)2 72.38∗∗∗ (10.50)
Columbia −0.95∗∗∗ (0.21)
Disney −1.10∗∗∗ (0.23)
Fox −3.30∗∗∗ (0.26)
Paramount −1.96∗∗∗ (0.29)
Universal −2.96∗∗∗ (0.24)
Warner −2.25∗∗∗ (0.21)
Other studios −1.98∗∗∗ (0.44)
R2 0.76
Note. “∆DVD revenue” denotes difference in DVD revenue between
as observed (consumers with observed consumer preferences) and
if all consumers were freshness-insensitive; Coeff., coefficient; S.E.,
standard error; all tests two sided.
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
dates and revenues (of large and small movies). There-
fore, we conduct the following analysis. We simulate
DVD revenues given freshness-insensitive consumers.8
Table 7 reports the results of a regression where the
dependent variable is the difference in the expected
DVD revenues from consumers with observed pref-
erences and if all consumers were freshness insensi-
tive. The independent variables are a quadratic func-
tion of prior theatrical revenues and studio dummies.
We find that for smaller movies, freshness sensitivity
decreases revenues. For larger movies, the converse is
true: freshness sensitivity increases expected revenues.
This is because freshness sensitivity reduces crowding
(relative to equilibrium release dates given freshness-
insensitive consumers) in peak weeks; this dispropor-
tionately benefits larger movies.
Summarizing, our analysis from estimation and sim-
ulations finds the following: conservatism manifests
itself via larger coefficients on revenues from larger
movies and revenues from freshness-sensitive custo-
mers. The net result of the two weights is more crowd-
ing in peak periods (the weight on larger movies in-
creases crowding, the weight on freshness decreases
crowding). These strategies increase the revenues of
larger movies at the expense of (resultantly lower) rev-
enues of smaller movies.
7. Conclusion
We develop a modeling framework to measure het-
erogeneous consumer preferences and marketing-mix
decisions in a dynamic competitive environment. We
examine the DVDmarket in the United States with this
modeling framework. We find two distinct consumer
segments with different (seasonal, freshness, and other
product attribute) preferences. Studios paymore atten-
tion to the DVD release dates of movies that were more
successful prior in theatres. This evidence is consis-
tent with previous studies of managerial conservatism
in this industry. Beyond this specific application, our
model of competition can be adapted to study compe-
tition in other contexts where the timing of new prod-
ucts depends on the preferences of multiple customer
segments and the competitive jockeying among rivals.
Our model has some limitations that may be bind-
ing in other applications. First, a model where com-
peting firms optimize by portfolio (i.e., across all prod-
ucts) rather than by individual product may be a better
description of reality. However, in a market with het-
erogeneous products (in our application, movies dif-
fer on several attributes), portfolio optimization leads
to a significant expansion of the action and state
space. Therefore, the extant empirical literature has
typically abstracted from this concern (see Hollenbeck
2017 and Sweeting 2013 for similar assumptions).
Another important feature of our industry that simpli-
fies the computation of our model is stable DVD prices
after release. In other applications, our model can be
extended to consider time-varying prices after release.
Finally, our model can also be extended to products
with different “versions” of products (for example,
hard copy and soft bound books, or free/basic prod-
ucts with paid upgrades). In each of these, researchers
are likely to be limited by the current state-of-the-art
in statistical and computational toolkits. However, we
remain optimistic that advances in technologywill lead
to new research opportunities.
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Appendix A. Algorithm for Estimating the
Demand Model
1. To compute market shares in any week, we assign equal
purchase probabilities across segments in the 12th week of
2000 (the week before the first week of data used in the
market-share model). In subsequent weeks, we use the law
of total probability to construct the fraction of consumers in
segment A, purchasing a DVD in week w:
Fs(w+1)Fsw
∑
d∈w
exp(udsw(Dsw 1))
1+∑i∈w exp(uisw(Dsw 1))
+ (1−Fsw)
∑
d∈w
exp(udsw(Dsw 0))
1+∑i∈w exp(uisw(Dsw 0)) , (A.1)
where Fsw denotes the proportion of the consumers in a seg-
ment that purchased a DVD in the week prior to w—i.e., in
week w − 1, w denotes the set of DVDs available for pur-
chase in week w, udsw(Dsw  1) is the utility from purchasing
DVD d to a consumer in segment s who purchased a DVD in
the preceding period (i.e., w−1), and udsw(Dsw  0) is the util-
ity from purchasing DVD d to a consumer in segment s who
did not purchase a DVD in the preceding period (i.e., w − 1).
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2. We use the contraction map (udAw)n+1  (udAw)n +
log(mktsh′dw/mktshdw) to recover udAw , the utility to a con-
sumer in segment A from DVD d in week w. mktsh′dw/
mktshdw is the ratio of the measured share to the computed
share of DVD d in week w (aggregated across all segments).
Coefficients of the utility of the segment A are recovered from
the fixed points of the contraction, while segment differences
in heterogeneous parameters are recovered as parameters in
an outer loop.
3. We estimate the model using the generalized method
of moments (see Berry et al. 1995). We first assume that the
errors are homoscedastic to arrive at a consistent estimator
of the parameters. In a second step, we use the first-stage
estimates to recover a variance matrix that allows for both
intraweek correlation and heteroscedasticity, and reestimate
the model. Clustering standard errors by week allows resid-
ual week-specific demand shocks, beyond seasonal controls,
to be common across DVDs in a week.
4. To maintain tractability, we sequentially test for the
appropriate number of model components. Following Livera
et al. (2011), we add spectral components until additional
components are not significant. Next, we increase the num-
ber of segments in the model. Following Soysal and Krishna-
murthi (2012), as the N segment model is nested in the N + 1
segment model, the joint significance of the class allocation
probabilities in the N + 1 segment model is a test of model
specification.
5. To accelerate the rate of convergence of the fixed-point
algorithm, we use rank-reduced extrapolation, as discussed
by Varadhan and Roland (2008). Acceleration schemas are
operators from a (globally convergent) contraction map to
a (globally convergent) contraction map, where the output
mapping requires less iteration to convergence. In our expe-
rience, all three acceleration algorithms given by Varadhan
and Roland (2008) substantially increase the rate of conver-
gence of the stock Berry–Levinsohn–Pakes map, dramatically
reducing computational loadwhile preserving global conver-
gence. We use the augmented Lagrangian adaptive barrier
minimization algorithm to enforce the constraint that class
allocation probabilities must sum to one, and estimate using
mathematical programming with equality constraints (see
Madsen et al. 2004 for a discussion and Varadhan 2011 for an
implementation).
Appendix B. Algorithm for Estimating the
Release-Timing Model
1. We estimate the following three equations:
(a) Mean price of a DVD:
p¯d  λ11 + λ1y +
H∑
h1
(
λ1ah sin
(
2pihr
52
)
+ λ1bh cos
(
2pihr
52
))
+ λ1xxd + ζ1d , (B.1)
where λ11 is a segment-specific intercept, λ1y is a year-
specific fixed effect, λ1ah and λ1bh are the Fourier coefficients,
H is the number of harmonics of the fundamental frequency
(corresponding to annual periodicity) included in the model,
w is the week the movie was released in theaters, r is w mod-
ulo 52, and y is the year to which w corresponds. λ1x is a
vector of coefficients and fixed effects corresponding to the
attributes of the movie (xd). ζ1d is the error term.
(b) Freshness of a DVD:
WBd  λ21 + λ2y +
H∑
h1
(
λ2ah sin
(
2pihr
52
)
+ λ2bh cos
(
2pihr
52
))
+ λ2xxd + ζ2d , (B.2)
where λ21 is a segment-specific intercept, λ2y is a year-specific
fixedeffect, andλ2ah andλ2bh are theFourier coefficients.λ2x is
a vector of coefficients and fixed effects corresponding to the
attributes of themovie (xd). ζ2d is the error term.
(c) Weekly price of a DVD:
pdw  λ31 + λ3y +
H∑
h1
(
λ3ah sin
(
2pihr
52
)
+ λ3bh cos
(
2pihr
52
))
+
4∑
j1
λ3δ jδ jw + λ3xxd + λ3WB log(WBd)
+ λ3WR log(WRdw)+ ζ3d , (B.3)
where λ31 is a segment-specific intercept, λ3y is a year-
specific fixed effect, λ3ah and λ‘3bh are the Fourier coefficients,
and λ3δ j , j ∈ {1, . . . , 4} are the four state vector coefficients.
λ3x is a vector of coefficients and fixed effects corresponding
to the attributes of the movie (xd). λ3WB is the coefficient on
the number ofweeks between theatrical andDVD release and
λ3WR is the coefficient on the number of weeks since DVD
release. ζ3d is the error term.
2. We construct the inclusive value of entrants each week
from the demand estimates, and the expected average price
and freshness. The augmented Dickey–Fuller test rejects the
null of nonstationarity for all four state variables (p < 0.01).
We use a vector autoregressive model with exogenous vari-
ables (VARX) to track the evolution of the state vector. The
Wold theorem implies that under mild regularity conditions,
stationary vector time series have a VARX representation.
A VARX model allows for a vector of endogenous variables
(in our case the state vector) to depend on the lagged val-
ues of the endogenous variables and a design matrix of
exogenous variables (the exogenous matrix consists of an
intercept, the 14 Fourier basis variables, and five year fixed
effects). The VARXmodel is thus a flexible tool to capture the
evolution of a multivariate Markov process. The forecasts of
the VARX reflects expected states in periods t + 1, t + 2, . . .
based on the common information in period t (Nĳs et al.
2001) and hence provide the empirical analog of {Ψd(w+ j)}38j1.
Note that the VARX model allows both the inclusive value
describing current competitors and the inclusive value of
potential entrants to jointly affect each other (both sets of
variables are treated as being endogenous in the VARX). The
forecast state vector in a period is the equilibrium distribu-
tion of the inclusive value of the industry (the aggregative
statistic) in a period. We use the distribution of the industry
to compute the distribution of prices after entry.
3. Let Ωd  {Ωdr : r ∈ R} be the collection of probabilities,
indexed by DVD d, over the set of candidate release dates R.
The contribution of each focal DVD in a week to the aggrega-
tive statistic is ∑t≤wΩdt exp(Eudsw(t)), where Ωdt is obtained
from step 1(b) and Eudsw(t) is the expected utility from pur-
chasing DVD d to a consumer in segment s in week w, if the
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DVDwere released on t. Hence, the distribution of the inclu-
sive values of rivals corresponding to freshness insensitive
segment is given by
log
(
E exp(δ1w) −
∑
t≤w
Ωdt exp(EudFSw(t))
)
, (B.4)
where δ1w is the first component of the predicted indus-
try state vector. And the distribution of the inclusive values
of rivals corresponding to freshness insensitive segment is
given by
log
(
E exp(δ2w) −
∑
t≤w
Ωdt exp(EudFIw(t))
)
, (B.5)
where δ2w is the second component of the industry state
vector.
4. For each week in the planning horizon, we compute
the expected revenue for a candidate release date by com-
puting a two-dimensional integral over the distribution of
prices after release of the focal DVD and the expected state
vector in the period. We use sparse grids quadrature (with
128 nodes) to construct the integral (see Schmedders and
Judd 2014, p. 354).
Appendix C. Algorithm for Estimating Equilibrium
Revenue in the Counterfactuals
1. For each movie, we compute expected revenues from
each candidate release date, holding constant the observed
release schedules of competitors, as in step 3 of Appendix B.
Let Ωd  {Ωdr : r ∈ R} be the collection of probabilities,
indexed by DVD d, over the set of candidate release dates R.
2. We compute the expected state variable (Eδw) as
Eδw 

log
(∑
i∈Ξw
∑
t≤w
Ωit exp(EuiFSw(t))
)
log
(∑
i∈Ξw
∑
t≤w
Ωit exp(EuiFIw(t))
)
log
(∑
i∈Ξw
(
1−∑
t≤w
Ωit
)
exp(ƐuiFSw)
)
log
(∑
i∈Ξw
(
1−∑
t≤w
Ωit
)
exp(ƐuiFIw)
)

, (C.1)
where Ξw is the set of movies for which week w is a poten-
tial DVD release date, and EuiFSw(t) and EuiFIw(t) are the
expected utility to the freshness-sensitive and -insensitive
segments, respectively, inweek w if DVD iwere released on t.
3. We derive the laws of motion of the expected state vari-
able as in step 2 of Appendix B and recompute expected
revenues from each candidate release date, given beliefs. Let
Ω′d  {Ω′dr : r ∈ R} be the collection of release probabilities,
indexed by DVD d, over the set of candidate release dates R.
4. If ‖Ωd − Ω′d ‖ > threshold, then we set Ωd  Ω′d and
recompute steps 2 and 3. We use the Euclidean distance (the
square root of the sum of squared differences in policy func-
tions across iterations) and set the threshold to be 1e-4. In our
application, reducing the threshold further has virtually no
effect on our estimates.
Endnotes
1Several related aggregation concepts have been studied in the extant
literature. Due to differences in game structure across approaches,
to the best of our knowledge, there is no accepted definition of
an “aggregative game.” Jensen (2010) introduces quasi-aggregative
games and shows that several prior aggregation concepts can be con-
sidered special cases of quasi-aggregative games. Our model very
closely corresponds with Jensen’s definition of a quasi-aggregative
game (see Jensen 2010, Definition 1, p. 47). However, while Jensen
describes a game of complete information, we consider a game of
incomplete information. Jensen uses the term “quasi” to emphasize
that functions (see Jensen 2010, pp. 47–48) in his framework are
only determined up to monotonic transformations. As we specify
the inclusive value from the demand model as being the aggrega-
tor function, we henceforth refer to the release-timing model as an
aggregative game.
2For parsimony, we do not list all arguments of the utility func-
tion (for example, freshness and price) when describing the demand
model. In the release-timing game, as candidate release dates corre-
spond to different freshness and price, we explicitly list these argu-
ments of the market-share function.
3http://www.imdb.com (accessed July 21, 2014).
4Aggregate choice models typically embed single discreteness,
rather than multiple discreteness, models in the calculation of the
aggregate choice probabilities. A researcher’s choice ofmodels is lim-
ited by data as estimating multiple discreteness models requires dis-
aggregate data, which is not feasible in many applications (including
ours). Further, as multiple discreteness models operate on bundles of
choices rather than individual choices, the computational mechanics
of the multiple discreteness model scale as a polynomial function of
the number of choices (see Bento et al. 2009, pp. 679–680 for a discus-
sion). Thus, even with access to disaggregate data, researchers often
use single discreteness models to avoid the computational burden
that accompanies the estimation of a multiple discreteness model on
a large choice set (as in our application).
5A studio holds beliefs over 38 weeks in the future, corresponding
to the 26 weeks of the planning horizon and an additional 12 weeks
to account for revenue, and hence payoffs, after DVD release.
6Milgrom and Weber (1985) show that in incomplete-information
games, if players’ informational variables have an atomless distri-
bution, mixed strategies are empirically indistinguishable from pure
strategies. In such games, every mixed strategy has a purification:
“a pure strategy equilibrium at which each player has the same
expected payoff and the same distribution of observable behavior as
at the mixed strategy equilibrium in each of his informational states”
(Milgrom and Weber 1985, p. 619). Further, note that by construc-
tion, studios are, almost surely, never indifferent between two actions
(also see Aguirregabiria and Mira 2007, p. 8, footnote 3).
7 In the interest of readability, the figure focuses on the smallest stu-
dio (Paramount), two studios that are representative of the average,
and the largest studio (Warner) by movie output.
8We set the freshness-sensitivity coefficient of all consumers to zero.
Further, we model studios as maintaining their measured objective
functions, corresponding to a situation of studios persisting in their
beliefs due to a lack of learning as they decide their release strategies.
References
Aguirregabiria V, Ho CY (2012) A dynamic oligopoly game of the
U.S. airline industry: Estimation and policy experiments. J. Eco-
nometrics 168(1):156–173.
Aguirregabiria V, Mira P (2007) Sequential estimation of dynamic
discrete games. Econometrica 75(1):1–53.
Arcidiacono P, Miller RA (2011) Conditional choice probability esti-
mation of dynamic discrete choice models with unobserved het-
erogeneity. Econometrica 79(6):1823–1867.
Mukherjee and Kadiyali: The Competitive Dynamics of New DVD Releases
Management Science, 2018, vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 3536–3553, ©2017 INFORMS 3553
Bajari P, Benkard CL, Levin L (2007) Estimating dynamic models of
imperfect competition. Econometrica 75(5):1331–1370.
Basuroy S, Chatterjee S, Ravid SA (2003) How critical are critical
reviews? The box office effects of film critics, star power, and
budgets. J. Marketing 67(4):103–117.
Bento AM, Goulder LH, Henry E, Jacobsen MR, Von Haefen RH
(2009) Distributional and efficiency impacts of gasoline taxes.
Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(3):667–699.
Berry S, Jia P (2010) Tracing the woes: An empirical analysis of the
airline industry. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconomics 2(3):1–43.
Berry S, Levinsohn J, Pakes A (1995) Automobile prices in market
equilibrium. Econometrica 63(4):841–890.
BesankoD, Dube JP, Gupta S (2003) Competitive price discrimination
strategies in a vertical channel using aggregate data.Management
Sci. 49(9):1121–1138.
Chiou L (2008) The timing of movie releases: Evidence from the
home video industry. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 26(5):1059–1073.
Dorazelski U, Pakes A (2007) A framework for applied dynamic
analysis in IO. Armstrong M, Porter RH, eds. Handbook of Indus-
trial Organization, Vol. 3. Handbooks in Economics 10 (North-
Holland, Amsterdam), 1887–1966.
Einav L (2007) Seasonality in the U.S. motion picture industry.RAND
J. Econom. 38(1):127–145.
Einav L (2010) Not all rivals look alike: Estimating an equilibrium
model of the release date timing game. Econom. Inquiry 48(2):
369–390.
Elberse A, Eliashberg J (2003) Demand and supply dynamics for
sequentially released products in international markets: The
case of motion pictures.Marketing Sci. 22(3):329–354.
Fudenberg D, Tirole J (1986) A “signal-jamming” theory of preda-
tion. RAND J. Econom. 17(3):366–376.
Gallant AR, Hong H, Khwaja A (2018) The dynamic spillovers of
entry: An application to the generic drug industry. Management
Sci. 64(3):1189–1211.
Gardete PM (2016) Competing under asymmetric information: The
case of dynamic random access memory manufacturing. Man-
agement Sci. 62(11):3291–3309.
Gowrisankaran G, Park M, Rysman M (2010) Estimating network
effects in a dynamic environment. Working paper, Boston Uni-
versity, Boston.
Hennig-Thurau T, Henning V, Sattler H, Eggers F, HoustonMB (2007)
The last picture show? Timing and order of movie distribution
channels. J. Marketing 71(4):63–83.
Hess S, Ben-Akiva M, Gopinath D, Walker J (2011) Advantages of
latent class over continuous mixture of logit models. Working
paper, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK.
Hollenbeck B (2017) The economic advantages of chain organization.
RAND J. Econom. 48(4):1103–1135.
Holmström B (1999) Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic per-
spective. Rev. Econom. Stud. 66(1):169–182.
Horsky D, Pavlidis P, Song M (2012) Incorporating state dependence
in aggregate brand-level demand models. Working paper, Uni-
versity of Rochester, Rochester, NY.
Jensen M (2010) Aggregative games and best-reply potentials.
Econom. Theory 43(1):45–66.
Krider RE, Weinberg CB (1998) Competitive dynamics and the intro-
duction of new products: The motion picture timing game.
J. Marketing 35(1):1–15.
Lehmann DR,Weinberg CB (2000) Sales through sequential distribu-
tion channels: An application to movies and videos. J. Marketing
64(3):18–33.
Livera AMD, Hyndman RJ, Snyder RD (2011) Forecasting time series
with complex seasonal patterns using exponential smoothing.
J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 106(496):1513–1527.
Luan J, Sudhir K (2007) Optimal inter-release time between sequen-
tial products: Application to theatrical movies and DVDs. Work-
ing paper, Yale University, New Haven, CT.
Ma J, Huang D,Markovitch D, Ratchford B (2013) Should small firms
launch new products during high or low seasons? A framework
and empirical analysis. Working paper, Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute, Troy, NY.
Madsen K, Nielsen HB, Tingleff O (2004) Optimization with Con-
straints, 2nd ed. (Technical University of Denmark, Kongens
Lyngby, Denmark).
Milgrom PR, Weber RJ (1985) Distributional strategies for games
with incomplete information.Math. Oper. Res. 10(4):619–632.
Mukherjee A, Kadiyali V (2011) Modeling multichannel home video
demand in the U.S. motion picture industry. J. Marketing Res.
48(6):985–996.
Neelamegham R, Chintagunta P (1999) A Bayesian model to forecast
new product performance in domestic and international mar-
kets.Marketing Sci. 18(2):115–136.
Nevo A, Rossi F (2010) An approach for extending dynamic models
to settings with multi-product firms. Econom. Lett. 100(1):49–52.
Nĳs VR, Dekimpe MG, Steenkamp JBEM, Hanssens DM (2001)
The category-demand effects of price promotions.Marketing Sci.
20(1):1–22.
Orbach BY, Einav L (2007) Uniform prices for differentiated goods:
The case of the movie-theater industry. Internat. Rev. Law
Econom. 27(2):129–153.
Pattabhiramaiah A, Sriram S, Sridhar H (2018) Rising prices under
declining preferences: The case of the U.S. print newspaper in-
dustry.Marketing Sci. 37(1):97–122.
Prasad A, Bronnenberg B, Mahajan V (2004) Product entry timing in
dual distribution channels: The case of the movie industry. Rev.
Marketing Sci. 2(1):1–20.
Radas S, Shugan S (1998) Seasonal marketing and timing new prod-
uct introductions. J. Marketing Res. 35(3):296–315.
Ravid SA (1999) Information, blockbusters, and stars: A study of the
film industry. J. Bus. 72(4):463–492.
Rennhoff AD, Wilbur KC (2011) The effectiveness of post-release
movie advertising. Internat. J. Advertising 30(2):305–328.
Scharfstein D, Stein J (1990) Herd behavior and investment. Amer.
Econom. Rev. 80(3):465–479.
Schiraldi P (2011) Automobile replacement: A dynamic structural
approach. RAND J. Econom. 42(2):266–291.
Schmedders K, Judd KL (2014) Handbook of Computational Economics
(North-Holland, Amsterdam).
Shen Q (2014) A dynamic model of entry and exit in a growing
industry.Marketing Sci. 33(5):712–724.
Soysal G, Krishnamurthi L (2012) Demand dynamics in the sea-
sonal goods industry: An empirical analysis.Marketing Sci. 31(2):
293–316.
Srisuma S (2013) Minimum distance estimators for dynamic games.
Quant. Econom. 4(3):549–583.
Sweeting A (2013) Dynamic product positioning in differentiated
product markets: The effect of fees for musical performance
rights on the commercial radio industry. Econometrica 81(5):
1763–1803.
Varadhan R (2011) alabama: Constrained nonlinear optimization.
R package version 2011.3-1.
Varadhan R, Roland C (2008) Simple and globally convergent meth-
ods for accelerating the convergence of any EM algorithm. Scan-
dinavian J. Statist. 35(2):335–353.
Zwiebel J (1995) Corporate conservatism and relative compensation.
J. Political Econom. 103(1):1–25.
